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SUMMARY
The West Midlands was the ﬁrst English region to report sustained community transmission
during the ‘containment’ phase of the inﬂuenza A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic in England.
To describe the epidemiological experience in the region, West Midlands and national
datasets containing laboratory-conﬁrmed A(H1N1)pdm09 virus cases in the region during
the ‘containment’ phase were analysed. The region accounts for about 10·5% of England’s
population, but reported about 42% of all laboratory-conﬁrmed cases. Altogether 3063 cases
were reported, with an incidence rate of 56/100000 population. School-associated cases accounted
for 25% of cases. Those aged <20 years, South Asian ethnic groups, and residents of urban and
socioeconomically deprived areas were disproportionately affected. Imported cases accounted for
1% of known exposures. Regional R0 central estimates between 1·41 and 1·43 were obtained.
The West Midlands experience suggests that interpretation of transmission rates may be affected
by complex interactions within and between sub-populations in the region.
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INTRODUCTION
In the UK and elsewhere early cases of a novel strain
of swine inﬂuenza were identiﬁed in April 2009, ﬁrst
in Mexico and then North America, before rapidly
spreading to other parts of the world [1].
Pre-existing pandemic plans were implemented,
a number of these having an initial ‘delay’ or
‘containment’ phase designed to restrict spread of
the pandemic virus [2]. Preparedness for this type
of incident is crucial, requiring use of high-quality
surveillance systems to guide operational decision-
making [3].
In England, these systems reported the ﬁrst
laboratory-conﬁrmed case of inﬂuenza A(H1N1)
pdm09 on 29 April 2009, in a traveller returning from
Mexico. By 2 July 2009, at the end of the containment
phase, England had reported 6162 laboratory-
conﬁrmed cases [4]. By 9 July 2009, 335 hospitalised
cases and 12 deaths due to pandemic inﬂuenza had
been reported [5].
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This paper provides an epidemiological analysis
of conﬁrmed cases of A(H1N1)pdm09 virus in the
West Midlands region, England, accounting for
about 42% of laboratory-conﬁrmed cases reported
during the containment phase of the epidemic, and
was also the ﬁrst English region to report sustained
community transmission [4].
METHODS
The Appendix (see Supplementary online material)
provides the context for the study.
Ethical approval
This work was conducted as part of the public health
response to pandemic inﬂuenza in England. As such
no explicit ethical approval was necessary or sought.
Case deﬁnitions
The initial containment phase in England involved
individual case management, including diagnostic
sampling (nose or throat swabbing or both), antiviral
treatment of all suspected cases, and prophylaxis
of close contacts of laboratory-conﬁrmed cases [2].
Suspected cases were those with a history of fever
and acute respiratory illness, that in the 7 days prior
to onset had either been in contact with a known
conﬁrmed case or had an epidemiological link to an
area with evidence of sustained transmission (either
abroad or latterly in the UK). A conﬁrmed case
was deﬁned as a person with laboratory-conﬁrmed
inﬂuenza A(H1N1)pdm09 infection. Secondary cases
were conﬁrmed cases that had been in contact within
7 days of illness onset with a travel-associated
conﬁrmed case. Tertiary cases were conﬁrmed cases
that had been in contact within 7 days of illness
onset with a secondary case. Sporadic cases were
conﬁrmed cases with no travel history or known con-
tact with a conﬁrmed case in the 7 days before onset of
illness [6, 7].
Sources of surveillance data
During the containment phase response, data regard-
ing suspected and conﬁrmed cases of A(H1N1)pdm09
were entered by regional health protection staff into
FluZone, a national surveillance database with case
reporting and management functions [7]. Laboratory
testing was conducted on respiratory samples from
suspected cases (nasopharyngeal swabs), and the
majority of specimens from cases in the West
Midlands were tested for A(H1N1)pdm09 at the
Health Protection Agency (HPA) laboratory, Heart
of England Foundation Trust, Birmingham. Labora-
tory-conﬁrmed cases of A(H1N1)pdm09 virus were
reported to regional health protection staff who in-
tegrated these reports with demographic, clinical and
contextual information on FluZone.
Socioeconomic deprivation was considered by
assigning postcodes of residence recorded in Fluzone
for conﬁrmed cases to lower super output areas
(LSOA), for which a deprivation score was assigned
using the Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 2007
[8]. Deprivation scores were grouped into quintiles,
from the most afﬂuent to the most deprived quintile.
Cases were also mapped with ESRI software ArcGIS,
version 10.0 (Environmental Systems Research
Institute Inc., USA) using postcode data to assign
them to local health areas (primary care trusts; PCTs).
All conﬁrmed cases in FluZone were classiﬁed as
either ‘South Asian’ (a person of Indian, Pakistani
or Bangladeshi origin) or ‘non-South Asian’ based
on their ﬁrst name and surname. This classiﬁcation
was carried out separately by two HPA staff of
South Asian origin. Where there was disagreement,
a third opinion was sought.
A regional schools database was established by
regional staff to track school-related cases, recording
counts of conﬁrmed cases by school and school
closure details.
Information on conﬁrmed cases hospitalized in
the West Midlands was obtained from the national
Health Protection Agency Chief Medical Ofﬁcer
(HPA CMO) H1N1 hospitalization database [9].
Data presentation and analysis
Descriptive epidemiological data
Descriptive epidemiological data are presented as case
counts and cumulative incidence rates, stratiﬁed by
age group, sex, area of residence, socioeconomic
deprivation category, ethnicity, exposure, and illness
severity. Cumulative incidence rates were calculated
using mid-2009 population estimates [10] with 95%
conﬁdence intervals (CIs) constructed using the
Wilson score method.
For FluZone datasets, analysis considered those
cases with illness onset from 16 April 2009 to 2 July
2009 inclusive, or where unknown, a laboratory
conﬁrmation date from 16 April 2009 to 6 July 2009
inclusive. The schools dataset considered cases with
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laboratory conﬁrmation dates from 16 April 2009 to 2
July 2009. For hospital and laboratory data the period
considered is from 16 April 2009 to 6 July 2009 inclus-
ive, to capture cases with illness onset prior to and
including 2 July 2009. Hospital data are presented
by date of admission and laboratory data by specimen
sample date, or, where unknown, date of laboratory
test result. Summary estimates of the case hospitaliz-
ation ratio uses numerator and denominator data
from 16 April 2009 to 26 June 2009 inclusive, to cap-
ture those with symptom onset prior to and including
22 June 2009, before a change in management strategy
was introduced in ‘hotspot’ areas by 23 June 2009.
Reproductive number (R0) estimates
The R0 for the West Midlands was estimated. A log-
linear ﬁt was performed to the cumulative number
of laboratory-conﬁrmed cases with laboratory
sample/report dates 4–25 June 2009 inclusive, and
symptom onset dates 1–17 June 2009 inclusive. The
early exponential growth rate r was estimated as the
slope of this ﬁt, and R0 was then calculated using
methods presented by Wallinga & Lipsitch [11]:
R0 = 1+ rTc,
Tc is the serial interval, or the average time between
infection in one case and transmission to a subsequent
case. This quantity has been estimated through quan-
titative meta-analysis as Tc=3·0 (95% CI 2·4–3·6)
days [12].
The time periods were chosen to be late enough
that early chance events were unlikely to inﬂuence
the estimate, and the epidemic had settled into expo-
nential growth; and early enough that the report
rate had not declined due to health system capacity
and changes in management protocols. To test this,
we made use of the idea of an effective growth rate
(reff) on day t, given a previous observation T days
ago:
reff (t) = (1/T)ln(C(t)/C(t− T)),
where C(t) is the incidence on day t and ln() is the
natural logarithm. Semi-parametric, splinal ﬁts of
these effective daily growth rate estimates showed a
reasonably constant value of r during the time period
ﬁtted for.
RESULTS
Diagnostic testing
From 16 April 2009 to 6 July 2009 (end of the con-
tainment phase) the West Midlands regional HPA
laboratories had tested 8524 specimens for suspected
A(H1N1)pdm09, of which 3063 (35·9%) were positive.
The majority (81%) of test results were reported from
10 June to 2 July 2009 (Fig. 1), during this period
weekly positivity rates ranged from 31·4% to 44·6%
(mean 38·6%). Due to changes in management prac-
tices from 23 June 2009 onwards, case ascertainment
is incomplete. From 16 April 2009 to 26 June 2009
inclusive (capturing cases with illness onset prior to
23 June 2009), there were 2276 reported laboratory-
conﬁrmed cases in the West Midlands.
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Fig. 1. Epidemic curve of laboratory-conﬁrmed cases and proportion of positive pandemic (H1N1) 2009 laboratory results
in the West Midlands with sample date/report date from 16 April to 6 July 2009 inclusive (n=3063).
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Epidemiological characteristics
The cumulative incidence rate for laboratory-
conﬁrmed cases was 56/100000 (95% CI 54–58) popu-
lation (16 April 2009 to 6 July 2009). The median age
of conﬁrmed cases was 12 years (range <1 month
to 80 years), with 70% (2096/2978) of cases aged
<20 years, and school-aged children (5–16 years)
accounting for 55·5% (1653/2798) of all cases. The
cumulative incidence of conﬁrmed illness was highest
in children aged 5–9 years (247/100000 population).
Gender was not known for 58/2978 cases (1·9%). Of
the remaining cases, 50·1% (1463/2920) were women,
and 49·9% (1457/2920) were men. This distribution
was not consistent across all age groups. In those
aged 520 years, a signiﬁcantly higher proportion
of cases were women (60·3%, 95% CI 56·9–63·5 com-
pared to 37·9%, 95% CI 34·7–41·3 in men), the op-
posite was true for those aged <20 years (53·4%,
95% CI 51·2–55·5 in men compared to 44·6%, 95%
CI 42·5–46·7 in women).
Laboratory-conﬁrmed cases were reported from
all health areas (PCTs) in the West Midlands region.
The majority of cases (66·9%, 1991/2978) lived in
Birmingham or the surrounding urban areas com-
prising the West Midlands metropolitan area. The
number of conﬁrmed cases within more rural areas
of the region was low.
Socioeconomic indices could be identiﬁed for 92%
(2754/2978) of cases and marked social inequalities
were seen. A signiﬁcantly greater proportion of con-
ﬁrmed cases were from the most socioeconomically
deprived quintile in the region (1837/2754; 66·7%,
95% CI 64·9–68·5), compared to the most afﬂuent
quintile (170/2754; 6·2%, 95% CI 5·3–7·1).
The majority of cases (2753/2978, 92%) were class-
iﬁed into one of two ethnic groups. A signiﬁcantly
greater proportion of laboratory-conﬁrmed cases
were reported in South Asian individuals (1595/2753;
57·9%, 95% CI 56·1–59·8), than non-South Asian
(1158/2753; 42·1%, 95% CI 40·2–43·9).
Exposure
Exposure history (Fig. 2) was available for 89%
(1747/1967) of cases in FluZone with a recorded
date of illness onset. The majority of cases (56%,
1105/1967) were classiﬁed as sporadic, and others
as secondary or tertiary (32%, 622/1967). Only a
minority were travel-related cases (1%, 27/1967). For
the remaining 11% of cases (220/1967) the route of
transmission was not recorded. Of the travel-related
cases, 13 (48%, 13/27) reported travel to the USA
and three to Mexico.
Three hundred and forty-four schools contacted the
HPA during the containment phase to report unusual
patterns of pupil or staff absenteeism. Of these, 209
(61%) had at least one laboratory-conﬁrmed case,
127 (61%) were primary schools. Sixty-ﬁve (19%)
schools were closed at some time from 16 April 2009
to 2 July 2009 inclusive. About one third (35%,
23/65) of schools were closed as an outbreak
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Fig. 2. Laboratory-conﬁrmed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases in the West Midlands during the containment phase by illness
onset date and route of transmission (n=1967). Includes cases in the FluZone dataset (n=1962) meeting dataset
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management intervention, 21 (32%) for operational
reasons (such as high staff absence), and one to pro-
tect children with particular medical needs. Reasons
for closure were not stated for the remaining schools.
School-associated cases comprised 25% (95% CI
24–27) of all cases (778/3063) in the region.
Severity of illness
There were 195 cases hospitalized from 16 April 2009
to 6 July 2009 inclusive, the highest admission
incidence was reported in the 0–4 years age group:
14/100000 (95% CI 11–18) population. Of the 195 ad-
missions, 110 (56%) were women, of whom 12 (11%)
were pregnant. Ten admitted cases (5% of hospitalized
cases) required intensive-care admission, four (2%) re-
quired high-dependency unit admission. Ninety-ﬁve
(48%) admitted cases had chronic disease conditions,
18 (9%) having more than one condition. The most
commonly reported comorbidities were asthma
(24%, 47/195) and chronic respiratory disease (8%,
15/195). Five of the 10 intensive-care admissions had
underlying chronic disease comorbidities and there
was one death in hospital, in a patient with more
than one comorbidity. From 16 April 2009 to
26 June 2009 (capturing all case-patients with illness
onset prior to but not including 23 June 2009), there
were 115 hospital admissions in laboratory-conﬁrmed
case-patients, giving a reported case-patient hospital-
ization incidence of 5% (115/2276).
Estimates of R0
Examination of laboratory sample/report dates
gave exponential growth estimates of r=0·144 (95%
CI 0·137–0·152) days−1 and R0=1·43 (95% CI 1·34–
1·52) days−1. Symptom onset dates gave exponential
growth rate estimates of r=0·136 (95% CI 0·129–
0·143) days−1 and R0=1·41 (95% CI 1·33–1·49)
days−1. The application of splinal methods shows
that there is some evidence of a reduction in r during
the periods considered, probably due to increasing
difﬁculty of case ascertainment and changes in man-
agement strategies, but this does not bias the log-
linear ﬁt (Fig. 3).
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DISCUSSION
The West Midlands was greatly impacted by inﬂuenza
A(H1N1)pdm09 and, its epidemiological experience
differed from that seen elsewhere in England.
Although the West Midlands region accounts for
about 10·5% of England’s population, it was dispro-
portionately affected compared to other English re-
gions during the containment phase, reporting 42%
of all laboratory-conﬁrmed cases, and was the ﬁrst
English region to report sustained community trans-
mission [4].
The highest incidence of conﬁrmed cases was in
the 5–9 years age group, and 25% of the disease
burden was school-associated, particularly in primary
schools. Certain population groups were dispro-
portionately affected: those aged <20 years; residents
of Birmingham and surrounding urban areas; those
living in the most deprived areas of the region; and
people from the South Asian ethnic minority group.
Imported cases accounted for 1% of known exposures.
There was a 5% case hospitalization ratio and one
death. The links with transmission in school-aged chil-
dren and within deprived communities were also fea-
tures of the London experience [13].
The reported incidence of 56/100000 population
conﬁrmed cases during the containment phase in the
West Midlands greatly underestimates the true inci-
dence, as it reﬂects only those who sought medical
attention and assumes a perfect diagnostic test. HPA
case estimates for the West Midlands during the con-
tainment phase (up to and including 5 July 2009)
suggest that the estimated incidence in the West
Midlands was higher than other English regions with
the exception of London [14]. These case estimates
have also been shown to underestimate the likely true
incidence, due to inaccuracies in assumptions regard-
ing consultation behaviours, a signiﬁcant proportion
of asymptomatic and mildly symptomatic cases, the
comparatively low virulence of the organism, and
the effects of control measures [14–16]. The age and
sex distribution of cases reported in the West
Midlands during the containment phase is consistent
with the national distribution [17], which is to be
expected as the West Midlands contributed substan-
tially to national rates. Although the distribution of
cases by sex was equal overall, there were signiﬁcantly
more women affected in older age groups, also con-
sistent with the national pattern [17]. This may partly
reﬂect differences in symptom reporting behaviours
[18], and increased exposure in caregiving roles [19].
Incidence was highest in younger age groups, con-
sistent with the 1957 (H2N2) pandemic but different
from the 1918 pandemic, which affected young adults,
and the 1968 (H3N2) pandemic, which affected all
age groups [20–22]. In the West Midlands, the recent
pandemic was probably driven by the large number
of school outbreaks, and school-associated cases,
attributable to children’s extensive contact networks
and infection susceptibility [20, 23]. Although there
is strong evidence that closing schools can reduce
peak and cumulative incidence, the cost-effectiveness
of different school-closure strategies requires further
evaluation given the social and economic impact of
such measures relative to the severity of a particular
pandemic [24–26]. In this study, about one third of
school closures were initiated for operational reasons
(e.g. staff absence). Future modelling or evaluative
work regarding school closures should take this into
account.
Cases occurred in all parts of the region but were
disproportionately clustered in urban areas, people
of South Asian ethnic origin and in people living
in the most deprived neighbourhoods. Data from
London and the West Midlands are similar with
regard to the greater number of cases reported from
socioeconomically deprived areas compared to other
areas, and the links between deprivation and mortality
due to A(H1N1)pdm09 have been demonstrated
[13, 27]. Although there is one study that provides evi-
dence of increased mortality in South Asian children
admitted to hospital as a result of A(H1N1)pdm09
[28], comparable data from other parts of England
with regard to ethnic differences in A(H1N1)pdm09
morbidity are lacking. However, research from other
countries reports similar ﬁndings to ours in ethnic
minority groups [29]. Although not fully understood
these ﬁndings may reﬂect community-speciﬁc mixing
patterns, health-seeking behaviour and socioeconomic
status.
In the West Midlands, the proportion of imported
cases (1%) appears very low compared to other
reports (range 2–78%) [2, 30]. The reasons for these
differences are unclear, but incomplete ascertainment
of imported cases is one hypothesized explanation.
The low proportion of imported cases identiﬁed in
this study is similar to the 2% reported by Fielding
et al. in Victoria, Australia [30]. They proposed
that a low proportion of imported cases suggests
early establishment and rapid spread of inﬂuenza
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus as a result of early silent import-
ations prior to recognition of the ﬁrst case. They
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further suggest that early establishment is character-
ized by a rapid increase in cases with no travel history
and a low median age during the most intense phase
of the pandemic indicating ampliﬁcation in young
age groups, features seen in the West Midlands.
In England, the West Midlands had the highest
regional number of admissions reported in the HPA
CMO hospitalization database for the week beginning
13 April 2009 to the week beginning 6 July 2009
(deﬁned to capture admissions in those with labora-
tory conﬁrmation from 16 April to 6 July 2009 inclus-
ive), reporting a higher number of admissions than the
cumulative total for other English regions. Although
time periods of concern are not directly comparable
during the containment phase, the 5% case hospitaliz-
ation ratio in laboratory-conﬁrmed cases in the
West Midlands, is similar to cumulative ‘worst-case’
scenarios, used in national pre-pandemic planning,
assuming no effective treatment [3, 31]. However, it
is higher than updated planning assumptions for the
early pandemic [32], probably to reﬂect case ascertain-
ment bias [14], resulting in over-inﬂated hospitaliz-
ation incidence estimates.
The estimated rate of spread (R0) of inﬂuenza
A(H1N1)pdm09 in the West Midlands was about
1·4. This is similar to that reported elsewhere and
for transmissibility reported for the 1957 and 1968
pandemics, but less than that for the 1918 pandemic
[33]. The West Midlands R0 of A(H1N1)pdm09 is
not markedly different from reported initial estimates
for England and Wales (range 1·2–1·5 for period
31 May 2009 to 7 June 2009 inclusive) [23], and on
its own does not explain why the West Midlands
was reportedly disproportionately affected in the
early stages of the pandemic. However, when the
other epidemiological features previously described
are considered it suggests that potentially a unique
combination of complex population contact patterns,
in addition to chance events, acted to establish and
sustain early exponential growth in the West
Midlands compared to other parts of England.
Support for this multifactorial explanation of our
results may be found by utilizing the ideas of Watts
et al. regarding the role of population interaction
structure [34]. Using hierarchical metapopulation
modelling, which envisages population structure as a
Table 1. Challenges and lessons learnt from measuring the effect of inﬂuenza A(H1N1)pdm09 in the West
Midlands during the containment phase of the pandemic
. Inﬂuenza viruses are unpredictable and past inﬂuenza pandemics were poor predictors of geographical zone of emergence
and severity of inﬂuenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus.
. Extent to which the information obtained could be used at a regional level in real-time was limited by pragmatic
considerations dictated by the circumstances in which data were collected, e.g. data collected in real time provided
supporting evidence of sustained community transmission in the region; however, more detailed analyses presented
here were carried out following the pandemic.
. Based on evidence provided by local data there is a need to allow local ﬂexibility with regard to tailoring response and
control activities to local needs without undermining national plans.
. There is value in investing in pandemic planning strategies and exercise and strengthening public health infrastructure as a
means of anticipating information and decision-making needs required to detect and respond to novel infectious disease
threats.
. Integrating existing inﬂuenza surveillance systems with newly established systems offered a more robust and
comprehensive means of monitoring inﬂuenza A(H1N1)pdm09; however, changes made to surveillance systems during
the course of a pandemic should be avoided.
. Access is required to timely and high-quality surveillance data in order to determine: trends; extent of severity of infection;
when to change policy and guidelines; and in order to support modelling studies.
. Effective, efﬁcient and timely integration and communication of data from surveillance systems are important for
decision-making.
. Interpretation of R0 may be inﬂuenced by the structure of the population through which it is spreading and similar
reproductive numbers may not result in epidemics of similar sizes and timings.
. Collecting school-related data and hospital data was challenging and surveillance systems had to be established to meet
speciﬁc information needs.
. Value of a database with both reporting and case-management functions and, of ﬂexible information management systems
that can be strengthened and expanded to meet key information needs was demonstrated.
. Accurate and rapid laboratory diagnosis and communication of results are critical for public health surveillance and
response operations.
. Surge capacity for laboratories, diagnostic services and the public health response need to be identiﬁed in advance.
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hierarchy of sub-populations or communities, they
suggest that the nature of an epidemic is highly sensi-
tive to the structure of the population through which
it is spreading. The concentration of transmission in
school-aged children and the unpredictable nature
of interaction between individuals in different sub-
populations or communities, suggests that similar
reproductive numbers may result in epidemics of
different sizes and timings [34]. We propose this as
one possible hypothesis for the early establishment
of the ﬁrst pandemic wave in the West Midlands in
2009. Other explanations could relate to links between
the West Midlands and other parts of the UK to
which travellers from Mexico returned, the intensity
of transmission within schools, and large household
sizes (linking schools together). It should also be
noted that the predominance of cases in South Asian
ethnic groups, in urban deprived areas and transmission
in school children may well have been much more sig-
niﬁcant than transmission within the region as a whole.
Limitations and lessons learned
There are challenges in collecting, using and inter-
preting surveillance data to measure the effect of a
pandemic. In the West Midlands a variety of surveil-
lance systems were used to measure the local impact
of the pandemic, and although each has its limit-
ations, by integrating local and national surveillance
systems, a more robust means of measuring the impact
of A(H1N1)pdm09 was established. Some of the chal-
lenges encountered and lessons learnt are summarized
in Table 1. A number of these are consistent with pre-
vious reports and are likely to apply to other public
health emergencies or outbreaks of novel infections
[3, 35–37].
CONCLUSION
Overall, the nature of the West Midlands experience
appears to have been due to a number of factors,
and highlights how interpretation of overall reported
incidence and transmission rates may be affected by
complex population interactions. Further analysis of
the West Midlands experience will help strengthen
future public health responses to novel infectious dis-
ease outbreaks or pandemics.
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